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IN SEARCH OF REDEMPTION:
Expungement of Federal Criminal Records
ABSTRACT
The presumption of innocence applicable to criminal proceedings is a hallmark of our
democracy. Nevertheless, if often proves difficult to overcome the societal stigma that attaches
to criminal charges – even decades after wrongfully accused defendants are exonerated. In
addition, the difficulties in overcoming the sundry legal and practical disabilities created by a
conviction perpetuates recidivism (thereby threatening public safety and consuming tax dollars)
by frustrating ex-offenders’ efforts at reentering society as productive, law-abiding contributors.
Barriers to reentry for nonviolent, good hearted, low-risk, onetime offenders may include, inter
alia: difficulty in securing post-conviction employment; hurdles in accessing educational and
training services, such as federal student aid ineligibility for certain convictions; a federal
lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, which can thwart
an ex-offender’s efforts to receive appropriate addiction treatment; eviction from public housing
based on an arrest prior to conviction and permanent ineligibility for public housing based on
conviction; ineligibility for federal and state occupational licenses; subjecting noncitizen
offenders to deportation; and obstacles to a healthy family life, such as a prohibition from foster
care and adoption programs.
These barriers disappear where a former defendant is able to expunge his/her criminal
record and is no longer forced to disclose it on applications for employment, educational
opportunities, housing, public assistance, and so forth. To cure this injustice, most states have
varying mechanisms to expunge criminal records. For example, many states – including New
Jersey – have enacted legislation providing for expungements as a matter of right for dismissed
charges and low-level misdemeanors and after proving rehabilitation to a judge if the records
pertain to certain nonviolent felony convictions. However, no statute creating a generally
available federal expungement remedy exists, and numerous Courts of Appeals have adopted the
view that there is no judicial authority to expunge federal criminal records absent specific
legislation or extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances. This paper will first examine the
problems for society and for former defendants created by those collateral consequences of
criminal records and the consequent inescapable lifelong sentence. Then, this paper will analyze
the disparity of expungement remedies available in the federal courts, which do not agree on
their jurisdiction to consider the issue; expungement powers pursuant to federal statutes; and
expungements made available by state statutes for state criminal records. Finally, this paper will
compare two congressional proposals to enact federal expungement legislation and argue for the
passage of a bill that combines the best elements of those proposals with effective state models.
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I.

Introduction
“To err is human, to forgive, divine.”1
The presumption of innocence applicable to criminal proceedings is a hallmark of our

democracy. Nevertheless, if often proves difficult to overcome the societal stigma that attaches
to criminal charges – even after wrongfully accused defendants are exonerated. In addition, the
difficulties in overcoming the sundry legal and practical disabilities created by a conviction
perpetuates recidivism among individuals who otherwise could have been one-time, first-time
offenders turned productive, law-abiding contributors to society. To cure this injustice, most
states have varying mechanisms to expunge criminal records. For example, many states –
including New Jersey – have enacted legislation providing for expungements as a matter of right
for dismissed charges and low-level misdemeanors and after proving rehabilitation to a judge if
the records pertain to certain nonviolent felony convictions. However, no statute creating a
generally available federal expungement remedy exists, and numerous Courts of Appeals have
adopted the view that there is no judicial authority to expunge federal criminal records absent
specific legislation or extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances.
With tens of millions of American criminal records readily available online2 and over
80% of American employers conducting criminal background checks on new hires,3 the
existence of a single nonviolent item on a criminal history – however old or innocuous – is

1

ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Criticism, in COLLECTED POEMS 58, 71 (1924).
Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal
Background Checks, 263 NIJ J. 10, 10 (2009), available at
http://www.nij.gov/journals/263/redemption.htm (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2003 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=290)).
3
Blumstein, supra note 2, at 10 (citing M.E. BURKE, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, 2004 REFERENCE AND BACKGROUND CHECKING SURVEY REPORT: A STUDY BY
THE SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2006)).
2

2

increasingly frustrating efforts of former defendants to secure employment, occupational
licenses, or customers in self-employed situations. Knowledge of the criminal history of an exoffender or even an innocent defendant who has been exonerated can “produce assumptions of
past dishonesty and future untrustworthiness in the minds of all those aware of that history.”4 As
a result of those assumptions as well as various statutory, regulatory, and organizational policybased disqualifications for individuals with certain criminal histories, former defendants are
forced to cope with, inter alia, injury to their reputations and difficulty in obtaining employment,
even when charges were dropped;5 eviction from public housing based on an arrest prior to
conviction and permanent ineligibility for public housing based on conviction;6 difficulty in
returning to school, as a consequence of federal student aid ineligibility for certain convictions;7
a federal lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families;

8

and

obstacles to a healthy family life such as a prohibition from foster care and adoption programs. 9
Considering the attention of policymakers and academia to reentry and reintegration,
there is a surprising paucity of scholarly literature examining expungement of federal criminal
records and the congressional proposals that have not advanced. Therefore, this paper will first
examine the problems for society and former defendants created by those collateral
consequences of criminal records and the resultant inescapable lifelong sentence. Then, this
4

Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation,
39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008).
5
See, e.g., Ritesh Patel, Comment, Hall v. Alabama: Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction to
Expunge Criminal Records?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 401, 401 (2010); Zainab Wurie,
Comment, Tainted: The Need for Equity Based Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L.
STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 31, 32-33 (2012).
6
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
7
20 U.S.C. 1091(r).
8
21 U.S.C. 862a(a).
9
42 U.S.C. 671(20)(a) (requiring states to comply with the requirements of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 in order to receive AFSA funding).
3

paper will analyze the disparity of expungement remedies available in the federal courts, which
do not agree on their jurisdiction to consider the issue; expungement powers pursuant to federal
statutes; and expungements made available by state statutes for state criminal records. Finally,
this paper will compare two congressional proposals to enact federal expungement legislation
and argue for the passage of a bill that combines elements of those proposals with effective state
models.

II.

The Problem: Criminal Records Create an Inescapable Lifelong Sentence
The pervasiveness of criminal records in the Internet age creates a serious problem not

only for the offenders and subjects of the records, but also for the economy and for public safety
by proliferating recidivists and frustrating the ability of ex-offenders to reenter society and avoid
returning to prison. Law enforcement agencies nationwide made over 12.4 million non-traffic
arrests in 2011.10 Prison populations in the United States and taxpayer costs associated thereto
have skyrocketed in recent years.11 According to the Pew Center on the States, by 2008, one out
of every 100 American adults was incarcerated, and by 2009, one out of every 31 American
adults was either in jail, on probation, or on parole.12 The United States has more people in
prison than any other country in the world.13 The Justice Department’s FY 2013 budget request

10

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table29.
11
PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S
PRISONS 2 (2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf.
12
Id.
13
ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed.
2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
4

for the federal prison system is just shy of $7 billion,14 while state spending on corrections totals
an additional $52 billion annually.15 Therefore, America spends more on prisons than the entire
annual expenditures of many countries’ governments, including Ukraine, the Philippines,
Pakistan, Cuba, Chile, and Morocco.16 Furthermore, “[s]tate spending on corrections quadrupled
during the past two decades.”17
One of the primary factors exacerbating the problems of prison overcrowding and
correctional spending is recidivism. Nationally, 43.3% – nearly half – of inmates released from
prisons nationally were back in jail within three years.18 Even as the national crime rate has
declined steadily over the past two decades, the rate of recidivism within three years for released
inmates charged with a new crime (as opposed to parole violations) has continued to increase.19
Studies have shown that unemployment is a leading indicator of likelihood to recidivate, while
ex-offenders are less likely to commit a crime in the future when they have employment
stability.20
While the correlation between employment and (lack of) recidivism is unsurprising and
generally comports with the notion that idle hands are the devil’s workshop, it creates a chickenor-the-egg paradox. On one hand, we want ex-offenders to find jobs to help them stay out of
trouble and avoid returning to prison (while becoming productive contributors to society and the

14

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM (BOP): FY 2013 BUDGET REQUEST AT A
GLANCE (2012), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bop-bud-summary.pdf.
15
Pew, supra note 11, at 2.
16
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING: BUDGET (2012),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2056.html.
17
Pew, supra note 3, at 2.
18
Id. at 9.
19
Id.
20
Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Overriding Purposes and Basic Principles of Felony
Sentencing, OH. FELONY SENT. L. § 5:53 (2008).
5

economy). On the other hand, far too often, it is the ex-offender’s criminal record more than any
other factor (frequently, the only factor) that impedes securing lawful employment. Despite the
stated goal in President Barack Obama’s crime and law enforcement agenda to “break down
employment barriers for people who have a prior criminal record, but who have stayed clean of
further involvement with the criminal justice system,”21 the stigma associated with the record of
a criminal conviction – or even a mere arrest or unproven charge – continues to pervade job
searches by former offenders and even former acquitted defendants.
A study by the Society for Human Resource Management indicates that over 80% of
American employers conduct criminal background checks on prospective employees.22 In 2006
(six years ago, which is an eternity in the context of rapid advances in information technology
and online availability of data), more than 74 million American criminal records were available
online in automated databases out of 81 million criminal records on file nationwide.23
Considering the widespread proliferation of public records on the Internet, arrest and conviction
information – regardless of the nature of the offense or time lapsed – are readily available to
interfere with the rehabilitation and reentry of ex-offenders into society. Indeed, “collateral bars
to employment [can] prevent someone who was trained for a job while incarcerated—at
taxpayers’ expense—from taking the very job for which he or she was trained.”24
21

Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal
Background Checks, 263 NIJ J. 10 (2009), available at
http://www.nij.gov/journals/263/redemption.htm.
22
Id. (citing M.E. BURKE, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 2004 REFERENCE AND
BACKGROUND CHECKING SURVEY REPORT: A STUDY BY THE SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (2006)).
23
Blumstein, supra note 2, at 10 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2003 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=290)).
24
Christopher Gowen & Erin Magary, Collateral Consequences: How Reliable Data and
Resources Can Change the Way Law Is Practiced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65, 69 (2011).
6

Difficulty in finding post-conviction employment is only one of numerous reentry
barriers faced by ex-offenders.

The mere existence of a criminal record also perpetuates

recidivism (thereby threatening public safety and consuming tax dollars) by frustrating former
defendants’ ability to access educational and training services, healthcare, affordable housing, or
occupational licensure; subjecting noncitizen offenders to deportation; and interfering with their
family lives (such as thwarting their ability to care for foster children or adopt). With all of these
hurdles to reentering society, one can hardly be surprised that so many low-risk first-time
offenders are drawn back into criminal activity, propagating the cycle of recidivism.
Specifically, these collateral consequences of a criminal record – creating a life sentence
for the defendant, even if the sentence for a relatively minor offense was not custodial in nature –
include:
• A five-year prohibition from foster care and adoption programs for drug-related
convictions and other felony offenses.25
• A federal lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families,
which can thwart an ex-offender’s efforts to receive appropriate addiction treatment.26
• Ineligibility for federal student aid (such as grants, loans, and work assistance
programs) based on drug offenses.27
• Ineligibility for (and/or eviction from) public housing. Housing authorities may evict
an entire low-income household based upon a mere arrest, rather than waiting for a conviction,
pursuant to HUD regulations and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.28
25

42 U.S.C. 671(20)(a) (requiring states to comply with the requirements of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 in order to receive AFSA funding).
26
21 U.S.C. 862a(a).
27
20 U.S.C. 1091(r).
28
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
7

These barriers disappear where a former defendant is able to seal or destroy his/her
criminal record through a procedure known as expungement and is no longer forced to disclose it
on applications for employment, educational opportunities, housing, public assistance, and so
forth.
Some form of expungement of criminal records or similar relief is available in 46 states
of our union, as discussed below at § VI of this paper. One observer has uncovered a direct
correlation between unemployment rates and state expungement laws.29 Although extremely
rare, expungements are theoretically possible in certain federal circuits that have held that such
motions may be entertained under their inherent equitable powers, as discussed below at § III,
but not in other circuits. As such, whether a onetime minor offender or a defendant proven
innocent is permanently branded with the “scarlet letter” of a criminal record may depend upon
where s/he was charged with the offense and whether s/he was charged in state or federal court.
This is especially troubling since many state-level misdemeanors or equivalent (i.e., disorderly
persons) offenses overlap with federal misdemeanors, and numerous felonies at the state level
have nearly identical federal counterparts with which defendants can be charged. The decision
of which forum to charge a defendant is left entirely to the discretion of prosecutors, who may be
driven by external pressures or sometimes make such decisions based on untoward motivations.
For example, congressional and Justice Department investigations uncovered that federal
prosecutors politically targeted Democrats and soft-pedaled investigations involving Republicans
in certain federal districts during the presidency of George W. Bush.30

29

Marlin Bressi, The Link Between Unemployment and Expungement Laws (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://voices.yahoo.com/the-link-between-unemployment-expungement-laws-10446717.html?
cat=17.
30
In 2008, the Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice and DOJ’s Office of
Professional Responsibility released a report detailing a joint investigation into highly publicized
8

Considering that widespread disparities in federal criminal sentencing among geographic
areas and attributes of the defendant gave rise to the federal sentencing guidelines as such
disparities were viewed as anathema,31 it is equally unfair that defendants convicted of the same
exact misdemeanor or cleared of the same charges and otherwise equally situated face totally
different opportunities for clearing their names and redemption depending upon geography.
The cases in § III of this paper make evident that even in those circuits that have found
the elasticity of ancillary jurisdiction reaches expungement authority, defendants who have been
acquitted of all charges were usually denied expungement. Accordingly, unless charged with
and cleared of offenses in a jurisdiction where the remedy is available, even innocent persons
who were wrongfully accused are haunted by the allegations and associated stigma long after
their exoneration in federal court. The enactment of federal legislation uniformly providing an

allegations of politicization of federal prosecutors’ offices. The investigation examined whether
certain U.S. Attorneys were “removed for partisan political purposes, or to influence an
investigation or prosecution, or to retaliate for their actions in any specific investigation or
prosecution.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION
INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 1 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf. The investigation uncovered “significant
evidence that political partisan considerations were an important factor in the removal of several
of the U.S. Attorneys.” Id. at 325-26. For example, the Inspector General “concluded that
complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians and party activists about [U.S. Attorney for
New Mexico David] Iglesias’s handling of voter fraud and public corruption cases caused his
removal.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he bigger scandal, however, almost surely involve[d]
prosecutors still in office. The Gonzales Eight were fired because they wouldn’t go along with
the Bush administration’s politicization of justice. But statistical evidence suggests that many
other prosecutors decided to protect their jobs or further their careers by doing what the
administration wanted them to do: harass Democrats while turning a blind eye to Republican
malfeasance […resulting in] abuses of power that would have made Richard Nixon green with
envy.” Paul Krugman, Department of Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/opinion/09krugman.html.
31
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (discussing the need to shift
away from indeterminate sentencing and discretion to reduce disparities in upholding
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission under separation of powers principles).
9

expungement remedy for nonviolent, first-time offenders and defining its reach would go a long
way toward resolving these inequities.

III.

Circuit split: federal courts’ inherent powers and ancillary jurisdiction to expunge
criminal records
Given the absence of federal legislation expressly authorizing courts to expunge criminal

records except as discussed below at § III, federal courts have held that expungements
nevertheless may be granted pursuant to a court’s inherent powers or subject to the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction. However, as a result of a 1994 Supreme Court decision limiting ancillary
jurisdiction in the lower courts, a circuit split exists as to whether expungements may be
considered solely on equitable grounds. The Supreme Court twice passed on opportunities to
resolve the discrepancy.32
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Their powers are limited to those “authorized by
Constitution and statute.”33 Congress has provided, “The district courts of the United States shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of
the United States.”34 However, the courts’ reach includes inherent powers 1) derived from
Article III and grounded in the separation of powers concept, vesting in courts certain judicial
powers “once Congress has created lower federal courts and demarcated their jurisdiction;”35 2)
arising from the nature of the court or necessary for the courts to exercise other powers, such as

32

Rowlands v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 598 (2006) (cert. denied); United States v. Coloian, 128
S. Ct. 377 (2007) (cert. denied).
33
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-137 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534,
541 (1986)).
34
18 U.S.C. § 3231.
35
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3rd Cir. 1985).
10

the contempt sanction to maintain order while administering justice;36 and 3) “rooted in the
notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a
Chancery Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and
equitable conclusion.”37 This inherent equitable power has been applied in several circuits to
find judicial expungement authority.38
Despite the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
allows those courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain matters that would otherwise exceed their
competence, if those matters are incidental to other matters properly being considered by those
courts.39 The seminal Supreme Court decision demarcating ancillary jurisdiction was Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., which explained that courts have generally asserted ancillary
jurisdiction for two purposes:
(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in
varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent, […] and (2)
to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.40
In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court in a 9-0 holding reversed the assertion of ancillary
jurisdiction by both a district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce a
settlement agreement disposing of an earlier lawsuit related to the termination of a general

36

Id. (citing Michaelson v. U. S. ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924)).
Eash, 757 F.2d at 564 (quoting ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351,
1359 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (courts enjoy inherent equitable
powers)).
38
See, e.g., Livingston v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States
v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2004).
39
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
40
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)
(asserting ancillary jurisdiction to order payment of adversary’s attorney fees as a misconduct
sanction); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (asserting ancillary jurisdiction to hold
parties in contempt as means of maintaining order during courtroom proceedings)).
37
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agency agreement.41 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected as overbroad
dictum from a 1904 Supreme Court decision: “A bill filed to continue a former litigation in the
same court…to obtain and secure the fruits, benefits and advantages of the proceedings and
judgment in a former suit in the same court by the same or additional parties…or to obtain any
equitable relief in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or proceeding at
law rendered in the same court…is an ancillary suit.”42 However, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction was neither rigid nor precise.43
Based on the foregoing powers of the court, most circuits found jurisdiction to expunge
criminal records on equitable grounds prior to Kokkonen, although several of those circuits never
actually allowed an expungement to be granted. However, several circuits have subsequently
reversed course in light of Kokkonen, finding that ancillary jurisdiction no longer exists for
expungement based solely on equitable grounds. Specifically, Courts of Appeals in the First,
Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have cited Kokkonen in declining to recognize ancillary
jurisdiction over expungement motions on equitable grounds, as have district courts in the
Eleventh Circuit. Conversely, appellate authority in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits continues to recognize jurisdiction for expungement motions pursuant to the
courts’ inherent powers.

a. Circuits declining to consider motions to expunge based on equitable grounds under
ancillary jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals to adopt this viewpoint most recently was the Sixth Circuit in 2010,
which despite a dissent from the Chief Judge of the Circuit held that the District Court for the
41

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 375.
Id. at 378-79 (quoting Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1904)).
43
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
42

12

Eastern District of Michigan correctly declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the
expungement motion of an acquitted defendant’s arrest record.44 In Lucido, a money manager
had been charged with sundry money laundering and conspiracy crimes in two indictments that
were 17 and 18 years old, respectively.45 Lucido was granted a judgment of acquittal by the
district judge in the first indictment, and he was acquitted of all charges against him by a jury in
the second indictment.46 Despite being totally cleared in both cases, records of his indictment
continued to haunt Lucido in a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) database,
which damaged his investment management business and impaired his post-acquittal success in
society.47
The Sixth Circuit analysis immediately dispensed of the first purpose of ancillary
jurisdiction prescribed by Kokkonen and focused on the second purpose: “to enable a court to
function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees.”48 To that end, a majority of the panel wrote, “These criminal cases have long since
been resolved, and there is nothing left to manage, vindicate or effectuate,”49 and therefore, the
court’s consideration of the expunction of records was not ancillary to the already-concluded
cases giving rise to the request.
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lucido modified its own pre-Kokkonen precedent in
United States v. Doe, where it had noted, “[i]t is within the inherent equitable powers of a federal

44

United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 873.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 874 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80).
49
Lucido, 612 F.3d at 875.
45

13

court to order the expungement of a record in an appropriate case,”50 as well as one postKokkonen decision in United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied
(May 17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 322 (U.S. 2010).
A similar analysis appeared in the relevant First Circuit precedent in United States v.
Coloian, where an attorney and former Chief of Staff to the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island,
sought to expunge records of a corruption indictment in which Mr. Coloian was totally
exonerated by a jury.51 Coloian asserted that the existence of the arrest and indictment records,
notwithstanding his acquittal, harmed his ability to practice law and otherwise conduct
business.52 The First Circuit considered the circuit split and joined the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, holding, “Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary jurisdiction to order expungement based
on Coloian's proffered equitable reasons.”53 As a result, no expungement of criminal records is
available on equitable grounds within the First Circuit.
In Dunegan, the Third Circuit considered a retired police officer’s petition to expunge
nearly 30-year-old charges for violating a suspect’s civil rights in an accidental shooting.54 As in
Coloian and Lucido, the retired officer had been acquitted of the charges, and no record of
conviction existed. However, since Dunegan had not alleged unlawful arrest or conviction or
“Constitutional or statutory infirmity in the underlying criminal proceedings,” the district court

50

United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 48 (1st Cir. 2007).
52
Id. at 49.
53
Id. at 52.
54
United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 2001).
51

14

did not have jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, whether of an acquittal or conviction.55
This view was upheld in United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006).56
The Eighth Circuit also backpedaled on the issue of subject matter and ancillary
jurisdiction in the wake of Kokkonen. Previously, the Eighth Circuit had held, “[c]onsistent with
other circuits, that a federal court may exercise its inherent equitable powers by ordering the
Attorney General to expunge criminal records in a particular case, provided that the case presents
extraordinary circumstances warranting such an exercise of the court’s equitable power.”57 But
the Court of Appeals applied Kokkonen to narrow its definition of ancillary jurisdiction in Meyer.
In that case, the panel found that Meyer, a pro se petitioner employed in the securities industry
who 18 years earlier had pled guilty to a single count of failing to file income tax returns and
served probation, “sought expungement based solely on the equitable considerations that his
employer was insured by the FDIC and that FDIC regulations restricted the employment of
individuals previously convicted of certain criminal offenses. Meyer did not allege that his
misdemeanor conviction was in any way invalid or illegal nor did he rely on any Constitutional
provision or statute authorizing either a district court or magistrate judge to expunge his criminal
55

Id. at 480.
David Rowlands, unlike the petitioners in Coloian, Dunegan, and Lucido, sought to expunge a
record of conviction. Twenty-four years prior to bringing the expungement petition,
Rowlands—a former Councilman and Mayor of Kearny, New Jersey—had been convicted of
conspiring to obstruct and delay interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
knowingly attempting to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by extortion, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951-52, and knowingly attempting to influence and obstruct a federal grand jury
investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Despite being sentenced to eight years in prison,
Rowlands was released after serving 10 months after two federal prosecutors urged the court to
reduce his sentence because of significant post-sentencing cooperation. Two decades later,
despite having letters of support from both Assistant U.S. Attorneys who had prosecuted him and
boasting a lengthy post-conviction history of productivity, community service, and making
amends, Rowlands remained unable to have his teaching certificate reinstated by the State Board
of Examiners as a result of his decades-old conviction. Rowlands, 451 F.3d at 175.
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Geary v. United States, 901 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Doe, 859
F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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conviction.”58 Finding that the proposed exercise of ancillary jurisdiction did not comport with
the second of the two purposes in Kokkonen, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
vacated the District Court’s order of expungement of Mr. Meyer’s arrest and conviction.59
For the same reasons, the Ninth Circuit declared that district courts lack ancillary
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records based on equitable considerations, holding that the
“expungement of an accurate record of a valid arrest and conviction necessarily disrupts [the
Tenth Amendment’s] balance of power and, in doing so, violates the principles of federalism
upon which our system is founded.”60 Basing its opinion on Kokkonen insofar as it concerned
the ancillary jurisdiction purpose of managing proceedings, vindicating authority, and
effectuating decrees, the Court of Appeals noted, “Expungement of a criminal record solely on
equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's rehabilitation and commendable postconviction conduct, does not serve any of those goals.”61
The present state of the law is unclear in the Eleventh Circuit, where the Court of
Appeals has not considered the issue since Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court opinion in
Kokkonen but several district courts within the circuit have adopted the view that ancillary
jurisdiction does not exist to consider expungement motions solely on equitable grounds.62

58

United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 863.
60
United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of
expungement motion for want of jurisdiction where Thomas Sumner, a substitute teacher seeking
permanent certification as a teacher, petitioned to expunge a nearly 30-year-old conviction for
unlawful possession of narcotics in Yosemite National Park while in his youth and was
sentenced to 90 days of probation and a $100 fine).
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Id.
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“Despite the circuit split, this court is comfortable that the Eleventh Circuit would follow the
post-Kokkonen theory discussed above and not the theory applied by other circuits not
discussed.” United States v. Paxton, 2007 WL 2081483, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 20, 2007). See
also Hall v. Alabama, 2010 WL 582076, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 2010).
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However, since all Fifth Circuit decisions that predate October 1, 1981, have precedential
authority on courts of the Eleventh Circuit,63 other district courts within the circuit are free to
adopt the view of the circuits finding that the elasticity of ancillary jurisdiction reaches equitable
expungements, in accord with pre-1981 Fifth Circuit holdings that have not been abrogated.64
Unlike the Sixth Circuit decision, which seems to have foreclosed judicial federal
expungements entirely, the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have left open the possibility
that courts may nevertheless have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge certain records on other than
equitable grounds, “in extraordinary cases to preserve its ability to function successfully by
enabling it to correct an injustice caused by an illegal or invalid criminal proceeding.”65 “When
we refer to ‘equitable grounds,’ we mean grounds that rely only on notions of fairness and are
entirely divorced from legal considerations […] [E]xpungement of a criminal record ‘solely on
equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's rehabilitation and commendable postconviction conduct’ did not serve the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction as articulated in
Kokkonen, and…‘a district court's ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an
unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical error.’”66 At present, the distinction
seems purely academic. This writer was unable to locate a single district court within these
circuits that has actually granted an expungement since Kokkonen.
63

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
See United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 747-50 (5th Cir. 1967) (granting expungement of
state criminal records of African-Americans who were arrested by state law enforcement officers
attempting to intimidate them against voting); Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir.
1972) (acknowledging the power of the courts to expunge records but finding that the power “is
one of exceedingly narrow scope” and vacating a lower court’s expungement order).
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Meyer, 439 F.3d at 860-62.
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Coloian, 480 F.3d at 51 (quoting Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014-15. See also Dunegan, 251 F.3d at
480 (holding that district courts do not have jurisdiction over expungement motions based on
equitable grounds, but declining to decide “whether a record may be expunged on the basis of
Constitutional or statutory infirmity in the underlying criminal proceedings or on the basis of an
unlawful arrest or conviction”).
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b. Circuits recognizing jurisdiction for expungement motions brought solely on
equitable grounds
Unlike the circuits in the foregoing section, in six other circuits, Court of Appeals
precedents continue to allow district courts to exercise jurisdiction to consider motions to
expunge criminal records solely on equitable grounds. In the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, the courts’ inherent equitable powers vindicate such authority.
Since Kokkonen’s narrowing of ancillary jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
pre-Kokkonen holding that “[D]istrict courts do have jurisdiction to expunge records maintained
by the judicial branch” (but not for Executive Branch records) and ancillary jurisdiction over
judicial expungements arises out of the federal courts’ inherent equitable powers.67 Courts in the
Seventh Circuit must apply a balancing test: “if the dangers of unwarranted adverse
consequences to the individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the records, then
expunction is appropriate.”68 The Court of Appeals elaborated on the balancing test in Flowers:
[E]xpungement is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy…“unwarranted
adverse consequences” must be uniquely significant in order to
outweigh the strong public interest in maintaining accurate and
undoctored records. We will turn first to the second part of the
test: the public interest in maintaining accurate records. That
interest is strong as evidenced by the statutory admonition found in
28 U.S.C. § 534 which requires the Department of Justice to
collect criminal records and make them available to state and local
law enforcement agencies. Records relating to a person’s criminal
conduct are vital tools to law enforcement and are…essential to the
computation of sentences under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. Other evidence of the weight of the public interest can
be seen in the long tradition of open proceedings and public
records, which is the essence of a democratic society.
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United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). See also United States v.
Kotsiris, 543 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969-70 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
68
United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993) (prescribing a balancing test for
expungement of judicial records but foreclosing judicial expungement of records in possession of
the Executive Branch).
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To outweigh that interest, “unwarranted adverse consequences”
must truly be extraordinary. The phrase does not refer to adverse
consequences which attend every arrest and conviction. Those are
unfortunate but generally not considered unwarranted adverse
consequences. It is possible, even likely, that any person with an
arrest or conviction record may well be impeded in finding
employment. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
stated, if employment problems resulting from a criminal record
were “sufficient to outweigh the government's interest in
maintaining criminal records, expunction would no longer be the
narrow, extraordinary exception, but a generally available
remedy.”69
It should be noted that although the Court of Appeals in Flowers recognized jurisdiction
to expunge on equitable grounds, a lower court’s grant of expungement was reversed and
vacated because Flowers had not demonstrated that the balancing test weighed in favor of
expungement.70 Consequently, Katherine Ann Flowers, a recently graduated practical nurse and
Lieutenant in her local fire department, was unable to expunge an 8-year-old one-count
conviction for violating 42 U.S.C. § 3631(b)(1) (“interfering with housing rights on account of
race”).71
Pre-Kokkonen precedent also remains undisturbed within the D.C. Circuit. “The judicial
remedy of expungement is inherent and is not dependent on express statutory provision.”72
Further, “courts have the inherent, equitable power to expunge arrest records…expungement can
and should be ordered ‘when that remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic
legal rights.’”73 In Livingston, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals called for a balancing of the
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Flowers, 389 F.3d at 739-40 (quoting United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir.
1991)).
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Flowers, 389 F.3d at 738.
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Id.
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Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Livingston v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Sullivan v.
Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973)).
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equities and “a logical relationship between the injury and the requested remedy.”74 The court
noted the need to consider expungements based on the necessities of each case, emphasizing
“flexibility rather than rigidity…[retaining] the qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation.”75
The Second Circuit likewise rejected arguments by the government that district courts
lack ancillary jurisdiction to hear expungement motions.76 Uniquely, the Second Circuit found
that applying ancillary jurisdiction to expungement cases – even where based solely on equitable
considerations – fell “within the policy of encouraging judicial economy.”77 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit limited the relief to extreme circumstances, the finding of which should involve a
“‘delicate balancing of the equities between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of
law enforcement officials to perform their necessary duties.’”78 Although the Court of Appeals
expressed its view over three decades ago, it has declined to reconsider in the aftermath of the
Kokkonen decision, and district courts within the circuit have agreed that federal courts remain
vested with inherent equitable powers to expunge criminal records.79
The Fourth Circuit followed the view of Schnitzer in Allen v. Webster, which has not
been abrogated by the Court of Appeals since Kokkonen and remains good law within the
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Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78.
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United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907
(1978).
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Id.
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Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539 (quoting United States v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804, 806-7 (S.D.N.Y.
1972)).
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See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 2012 WL 3614605 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012); United
States v. Rabadi, 889 F. Supp. 757, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Daisley, 2006 WL
3497855 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006).
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circuit.80 However, several district courts within the Fourth Circuit have declined to follow Allen
in favor of the no-ancillary-jurisdiction view of the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, noting that the Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue since the Supreme Court
narrowed ancillary jurisdiction in Kokkonen.81
The Tenth Circuit has stated, following Kokkonen, “[i]t is well settled in this circuit that
courts have inherent equitable authority to order the expungement of an arrest record or a
conviction in rare or extreme instances.”82 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has exercised
ancillary jurisdiction to find this authority.83 However, the Tenth Circuit has applied a
heightened standard to attempts to expunge convictions of persons “adjudged as guilty in a court
of law” vis-à-vis expungements of arrest records of a “presumably innocent person.”84
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Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1984).
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 847 F. Supp. 2d 828 (D. Md. 2012) (denying expungement
of a 8-year-old misdemeanor conviction for possessing a small amount of cocaine on equitable
grounds due to lack of federal ancillary jurisdiction, noting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Allen
predated Kokkonen); United States v. Mitchell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 427, 432 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(finding no ancillary jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 “because the act of entering judgment
of conviction in defendant’s criminal case divests a district court of original jurisdiction over
defendant’s case” and distinguishing from Allen); United States v. Gary, 206 F. Supp. 2d 741 (D.
Md. 2002) (making no mention of Allen but citing the Ninth Circuit decision in Sumner in
finding no ancillary jurisdiction to expunge solely for equitable considerations and claiming
there is no direct authority in the Fourth Circuit on the issue).
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Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing preKokkonen holdings in United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993) and United
States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975)). See also
United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1988) (trial court could not exercise its
discretion to order expungement of arrest without a factual showing of harm or extreme
circumstances).
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Id.
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Pinto, 1 F.3d at 1070 (holding federal trial courts are without power to expunge a conviction
that was in no way alleged to be invalid and defendant was only being harmed by the natural and
intended collateral consequences of conviction).
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Nevertheless, the fact that a defendant was acquitted was not “in itself sufficient to require the
trial court to expunge his record of arrest.”85
The Fifth Circuit has famously proclaimed, “Public policy requires … that the retention
of records of the arrest and of the subsequent proceedings be left to the discretion of the
appropriate authorities. The judicial editing of history is likely to produce a greater harm than
that sought to be corrected.”86 Nevertheless, post-Kokkonen, that Court of Appeals has asserted
inherent equitable powers under its ancillary jurisdiction to uphold an expungement of judicial
records upon a mere showing that the existence of the records burdened the petitioner, where a
conviction had been overturned.87 In the seminal Fifth Circuit case, a former federal law
enforcement officer whose 1986 wire fraud and conspiracy convictions had been set aside sought
expungement of the records of the arrest and overturned convictions.88 The Fifth Circuit noted
that federal courts have supervisory powers over judicial records, and the government had not
challenged the expungement order as it pertained to such records.89 However, the panel reversed
the district court’s expungement of Executive Branch records. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit
opined that the Janik court in the Seventh Circuit had gone too far in foreclosing the
expungement remedy against the Executive Branch, noting:
First, courts—not legislatures—have historically crafted remedies
when a claimant has demonstrated that his rights have been
violated. […] In the main, courts have not restrained their remedial
powers on account of the wrongdoers’ affiliation with the
executive branch. […] More importantly for our purposes, our
circuit has employed the expungement remedy before—in the
85
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87
Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
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absence of specific congressional permission—when no other
remedy existed to vindicate important legal rights.90
Nevertheless, the court adopted a narrower jurisdictional test than its sister circuits that
had found inherent equitable powers to expunge; to wit, the standard adopted in Sealed Appellant
was that the party “seeking expungement against executive agencies must assert an affirmative
rights violation by the executive actors holding the records of the overturned conviction.”91
Since the petitioner had not made a specific showing that any government agency was using
adverse information to harm the petitioner, the standard for invoking the expungement remedy
against the Executive Branch had not been satisfied and the order of expungement was reversed
as against the FBI.92
Although federal courts in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
have asserted ancillary jurisdiction to consider expungement motions on equitable grounds,
giving the appearance that the balancing test could afford ex-offenders or exonerated defendants
in these circuits a fighting chance to clear their records, the above cases make clear that the test
rarely tips in favor of expungement.

Occasionally, a bold district court has granted an

expungement of criminal records in one of the circuits permitting ancillary jurisdiction to be
exercised.
Within the Second Circuit, Senior District Judge Pettine ordered the FBI to expunge 15year-old investigative and arrest records of a petitioner who had been arrested at the age of 21 on
an extortion charge based on nothing but an angry letter written out of youthful impetuosity to a
liquor store owner who refused to sell him beer just after his twenty-first birthday.93 The grand
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jury refused to indict the then-21-year-old, and he went on to become an accomplished
economist. Nevertheless, the record of the arrest – despite the lack of conviction – had stymied
his advancement in a government contractor role that required a security clearance and
threatened his ability to emigrate to Australia.94 As Judge Pettine eloquently wrote:
The plaintiff is an accomplished economist. He has not been
involved with the criminal justice system in any way since the
folly of his youth. For this Court to insist under these
circumstances that the government’s general need in preserving
arrest records outweighs the harm caused by maintaining the
plaintiff’s record would result in a grave injustice—the evils of
bureaucracy and inflexibility would triumph over the virtues of
individuality and personal growth. In a fundamental way
expungement in this case protects what Justice Brandeis termed the
“right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and right
most valued by civilized men.”95
The Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, within the Seventh Circuit, granted
an unopposed motion to expunge the 12-year-old criminal records of an attorney who had been
arrested on a federal mail fraud charge that was subsequently dismissed.96 Within the Fourth
Circuit, an Eastern District of Virginia judge found after asserting the court’s inherent equitable
powers that the balancing test required expungement where a young, aspiring Washington
businessman was totally innocent and had been mistakenly charged in a cocaine distribution
conspiracy but faced obstacles to secure bank loans and government contracts, notwithstanding
the dismissal of the charges against him.97
More recently, the District of Utah relied on the Tenth Circuit’s balancing test referenced
in Linn and expunged the conviction records of a railroad worker and married father of three
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who had been charged with distribution of cocaine 20 years prior while a student at Weber State
University. 98 A federal prosecutor supported the expungement petition, noting the government
had no continuing need to retain the records, and the petitioner testified that background checks
prevented him from coaching his children’s sports teams and stymied potential workplace
promotions.99
Since these three cases were the only ones this writer could locate since Kokkonen in
which expungement was granted, these cases sadly represent exceptions rather than the norm.
Even in these circuits where ancillary jurisdiction exists, orders granting expungement are
usually as scarce as in the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. The circuits in this
section either have not revisited the issue since Kokkonen, or they have not viewed Kokkonen as
precluding expungement authority in the court’s inherent equitable powers. In sum, unlike the
circuits discussed in § III(a), these other circuits do continue to find ancillary jurisdiction for
expungement solely on equitable grounds.
Twenty-four years after pleading guilty to conspiring to obstruct and delay interstate
commerce, a former New Jersey mayor who went on to serve the public in noteworthy ways and
never committed another crime was unable to have his teaching certificate reinstated, despite the
pleas of both federal prosecutors and the federal judge in his case who insisted he had made
amends.100 A money manager cleared of all charges in money laundering and conspiracy
indictments continued to suffer harm to his reputation and investment management business two
decades after the acquittals, but he was nevertheless denied expungement.101 An exonerated
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attorney and mayoral Chief of Staff was likewise ineligible for the relief.102 A retired police
officer cleared of civil rights violations in an accidental shooting could not expunge the records
30 years later,103 and neither could a law-abiding securities industry employee who had
committed a single misdemeanor 18 years earlier.104 Therefore, whether or not filing in a circuit
that recognizes ancillary jurisdiction over expungement of criminal records, a petitioner seeking
such relief is not likely to find it in the federal courts.

IV.

Expungements pursuant to federal statutes
a. Expungement powers expressly granted by statutes
Although Congress has not enacted federal expungement legislation mirroring remedies

available in most states, offenders may be eligible for limited expungements under narrow
circumstances based on certain statutes.

One circumstance where Congress has explicitly

granted expungement authority to the Judicial Branch is where an offender was under 21 years
old at the time of a single offense involving possession of a small, “personal use” amount of
certain controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act,105 and the defendant
was granted pre-judgment probation (wherein the District Court dismissed the proceedings
without entering a judgment of conviction prior to the expiration of a term of probation). In such
cases:
The expungement order shall direct that there be expunged from all
official records, except the nonpublic records referred to in
subsection (b), all references to his arrest for the offense, the
institution of criminal proceedings against him, and the results
thereof. The effect of the order shall be to restore such person, in
the contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such
102
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arrest or institution of criminal proceedings. A person concerning
whom such an order has been entered shall not be held thereafter
under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury, false swearing,
or making a false statement by reason of his failure to recite or
acknowledge such arrests or institution of criminal proceedings, or
the results thereof, in response to an inquiry made of him for any
purpose.106
When an expungement is granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c), the Department of
Justice retains a sealed, nonpublic record of the conviction, “solely for the purpose of use by the
courts in determining in any subsequent proceeding whether a person qualifies for the
disposition” provided in the statute.107
Congress has also directed the Executive Branch to expunge its own records in limited
instances. For example, the statute authorizing the FBI to create an index of DNA identification
records of federal criminal defendants and convicts contains a provision requiring the Director of
the FBI to expunge the DNA analyses of persons whose charges are dismissed or whose
convictions are overturned.108 The statute authorizing the Department of Defense to collect and
index DNA samples of service members convicted of qualifying military offenses contains an
analogous provision requiring the expungement of the DNA analyses of military personnel
whose convictions are overturned.109
Congress has also authorized the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to expunge records related
to disciplinary matters involving the professional conduct or competence of Veterans Health
Administration employees, where a Disciplinary Appeals Board has recommended such a
remedy in resolving a disciplinary question.110 Separately, Executive Branch agencies have
106
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administrative procedures in place pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a that permit individuals who are
subjects of inaccurate government records to request correction of those records.

b. Expungement powers implicit in statutes
Ex-offenders have creatively resorted to other statutes that do not mention expungement
to seek relief, mostly without success. In Carey, a defendant who had years earlier pled guilty to
a one-count Information for conducting an illegal gambling business, served one year or
probation without incident, and led a commendable, law-abiding post-conviction life, brought a
motion to expunge his criminal records under the Federal Gun Control Act and asserted before
the Sixth Circuit that the motion’s denial violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms, in
turn violating his Fifth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.111
Carey argued that the expungement would have restored his right to possess or carry a firearm
and its denial therefore infringed upon a fundamental right.112 Carey further asserted that
congressional passage of the Federal Gun Control Act’s reference to expunged records implied
an expungement remedy for federal convictions.113
However, the Supreme Court had previously upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill […and] laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings […and] or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”114 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
111
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held, it follows that Carey’s inability to obtain an expungement did not violate a constitutional
right, and the Federal Gun Control Act – while not precluding expungements of valid
convictions and while disallowing expunged convictions to interfere with the right to bear arms –
conferred no authority on the courts to grant such expungements.115
As an alternative to the inherent equitable powers discussed above at § III, petitioners
have also asserted that courts enjoy a statutory conferral of expungement authority under the All
Writs Act.116 One petitioner in the Third Circuit articulately averred:
The United States Supreme Court … has clearly held that lower
federal courts may perform acts without an express statutory bases
pursuant to their general authority to issue common law writs
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 […which] grants federal
courts the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” […] See also United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d
425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that the All Writs Act was
designed to “fill the interstices of the federal post-conviction
remedial framework”). In other words, a federal court can take
whatever action is necessary to achieve justice unless that
particular action is prohibited by Congressional mandate.117
One federal court agreed that the statute does empower federal courts to expunge
criminal records.118

In granted an unopposed motion to expunge the 12-year-old criminal

records of an attorney who had been arrested and cleared on a federal mail fraud charge, the
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Wisconsin cited the All Writs Act and held, “In the
absence of a specific denial of power, this court may fully effectuate its jurisdiction and do
complete justice in the cases before it. […] This plenary power undoubtedly includes the
authority to order expunction of criminal records where circumstances demand such action. […]
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The exercise of the power, however, is discretionary with the court, with the decision to expunge
resting on the facts and circumstances of each case.”119
However, the Third and Tenth Circuits have rejected the reasoning in Bohr and proffered
by Mr. Rowlands. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Bohr with a brief observation, “While we
agree that the All Writs Act plays a part in enabling the court to issue the writs of error coram
nobis and the writs of mandamus necessary to accomplish an actual expungement, we believe
that the authority to consider the [expungement] issue in the first place is not contained in that
Act.”120 The Third Circuit held that since it had previously concluded no subject matter existed
to consider an expungement motion on equitable grounds, the All Writs Act could not empower
the court to issue a writ to vindicate its jurisdiction.121
Although the Third Circuit claimed in Rowlands that Bohr had been superseded by
Flowers as the Eastern District of Wisconsin falls within the Seventh Circuit, a close reading of
Flowers finds no analysis whatsoever as to the applicability of the All Writs Act, nor is the
statute even mentioned in the decision.122 Indeed, while the Seventh Circuit found inherent
equitable powers to expunge judicial records through the court’s ancillary jurisdiction and set
forth a balancing test, the balancing test could be reconciled with Bohr as the rubric for a lower
court’s determination of whether an expungement motion should be granted. Nevertheless, a
court may still derive the authority to expunge from the All Writs Act within the Seventh Circuit,
until the Court of Appeals says otherwise.
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V.

Separation of powers: may the Judicial Branch order the expungement of Executive
Branch records, and vice-versa?
Separation of powers principles derived from Articles I (establishing the Legislative

Branch and vesting lawmaking power in Congress), II (establishing the Executive Branch and
vesting “executive power” in the President), and III (establishing the Judicial Branch and vesting
judicial power in the federal courts) of the United States Constitution reveal another circuit split
pertaining to expungements that the Supreme Court has not resolved,123 creating another
argument favoring the need for federal legislation to bring clarity and equity to the issue.124
While several circuits and district courts have ordered, albeit rarely, the expungement of
criminal records retained by the Executive Branch pursuant to their inherent equitable powers,125
at least two circuits have held that to do so would violate separation of powers between the three
branches of government. Ironically, the Seventh Circuit – one of the most liberal circuits as
concerning its interpretation of a district court’s equitable powers to expunge judicial criminal
records – has held it is powerless to expunge Executive Branch records without a statute
expressly conferring such authority on the Judiciary even before Kokkonen.126 “To obtain
expungement of records maintained by the FBI or any other Executive Branch agency, [a
petitioner] must go directly to the Executive Branch. If the Executive Branch refuses, Congress
can act to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.”127

That Court of Appeals reiterated,

“[F]ederal courts are without jurisdiction to order an Executive Branch agency to expunge what
are admittedly accurate records of a person's indictment and conviction.
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We are without

statutory or constitutional authority to hold otherwise. In fact, in Section 534, Congress
suggested the opposite—that is, in favor of requiring the Executive Branch to maintain accurate
records of such convictions.”128
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lucido found that to order the removal of
FBI records of indictments resulting in acquittal “would amount to an extraordinary inter-branch
incursion, one that should not lightly be effectuated through the federal courts' unexceptional
right to oversee their own criminal cases.”129
One scholar argued earlier this year that since (in her view) “[t]he federal courts’
ancillary jurisdiction does not stretch so far as to allow the judiciary to be able to encroach on the
executive branch’s power by having the authority to expunge federal agency documents […],
there should be an equitable expungement petition process through the FBI that will afford
individuals the opportunity to have federally maintained records of arrest and indictments
expunged.130

Ms. Wurie’s law journal comment goes on to propose a process by which

individuals could petition the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division to have their
criminal records contained within the Executive Branch expunged by the Justice Department
itself.131
This approach, while laudable for its ingenuity and intention of providing a mechanism
for Executive Branch expungements under existing law, leaves much to be desired. Putting in
charge of expungement requests the very agency at the crux of most federal investigations and
prosecutions – many of which were botched in those cases where defendants were acquitted but
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nevertheless denied expungement132 – creates a situation of the fox guarding the henhouse.
Moreover, absolving the court system of involvement in overseeing expungement requests would
deny petitioners any meaningful method of appealing arbitrary or capricious denials by the FBI’s
appointed hearing officer.
Even if the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are correct in their constrictive view that courts
may not rely on their inherent equitable powers to order the expunction of Executive Branch
criminal records in extreme cases, there is no disagreement about whether Congress may grant
that authority to the courts. “Consistent with separation of powers, Congress may delegate to
judicial branch” additional authority that comports with the functions of the judiciary.133 Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit has explicitly stated, “Congress can act” to confer such jurisdiction on the
courts.134 Therefore, the legislation proposed by this paper would resolve the circuit split over
ancillary jurisdiction as well as the circuit split over separation of powers. Federal legislation
would maintain oversight by neutral arbiters – federal courts – rather than requiring the approval
of an Executive Branch investigative or prosecutorial agency.
While the Supreme Court has never considered the issue, most circuits have followed the
Third Circuit’s holding that the inverse situation – an Executive Branch order expunging judicial
records – is precluded insofar as a presidential pardon does not expunge the subject conviction
and the President may not order the Judicial Branch to expunge its records.135 The Supreme
Court held in Ex Parte Garland:
132
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A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents
any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction
from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.136
However, a half-century after Garland, the Court held that acceptance of a pardon
necessarily implies guilt.137 Reading the two decisions together and attempting to reconcile
them, the Third Circuit found that a pardon amounted to “an executive prerogative of mercy, not
of judicial record-keeping”138 and the President could not directly or indirectly expunge a
Judicial Branch record using the pardon power, despite its constitutional basis.139
The President could likely seal or destroy FBI, Department of Justice, or other Executive
Branch records pertaining to a criminal arrest or conviction. The Department of Justice opined
to the United States Pardon Attorney under President Bush, “Pardons that address the innocence
of the pardonee have not to date also commanded expungement of Executive Branch records of
the offense. If a President chose simultaneously to issue a pardon and order the Executive Branch
to expunge any such records, we believe that order would have the effect intended, subject to any
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statutory constraints on executive record keeping.”140

However, a concurrent pardon and

expungement order would necessarily operate as a secret pardon, lest the expungement lose its
value to the ex-offender in search of redemption, and judicial records would be unaffected.
The foregoing section illustrates that even if an ex-offender or exonerated defendant
succeeds in obtaining a rare expungement order in the Sixth or Seventh Circuits, or if an exoffender obtains both a pardon and an expungement order from the President of the United
States, such expungements would not serve to remove the deleterious disabilities associated with
the petitioner’s criminal record since records of the charge(s) would subsist in the other branch.
This only compounds the need for comprehensive federal expungement legislation.

VI.

State Expungement Laws
The failure of Congress to act has not precluded state legislatures from taking advantage

of the moral, social, and economic benefits of enacting expungement legislation; indeed, 46 state
legislatures have addressed expungement in some manner, as well as the legislatures of the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.141 Of those states, 40
states (nearly three-quarters of all states in our union) have statutes in effect permitting the
expungement of arrest records, while 24 states permit expungements even after a conviction in
certain circumstances.142
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Twenty-eight states permit the individual whose records were expunged to deny their
existence if asked, creating a legal fiction necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
expungement and clear the person of the stigma and lifelong collateral consequences of the
criminal record.143 In the states where statutes permit the eventual expungement of felony
convictions, most have imposed a requirement of greater temporal distance between the
successful completion of the sentence and the petition for expungement, ostensibly to allow
petitioners sufficient time to demonstrate they have led law-abiding lives and the antisocial
conduct was a one-off occurrence meriting the “judicial editing of history.”144 For example, in
the case of a dismissal, acquittal, or vacated conviction, expungement relief may be available
immediately (such as in Mississippi and New Jersey) or in as little as 30 days following
dismissal (such as in Indiana).145 For misdemeanors or disorderly persons offenses, state statutes
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may allow immediately expungement relief (as in Mississippi for first-time offenders)146 or
require a waiting period following completion of the sentence ranging from 3 years (as in New
Hampshire)147 to 5 years (as in Kentucky and New Jersey)148 to 10 years (as in Oklahoma).149
But in states permitting expungement of a felony conviction, the mandatory waiting period
extends to a minimum of 5 years in Mississippi and New Hampshire150 and could require 10
years to have lapsed since completion of the sentence (as in New Jersey);151 15 years (as in
Indiana and Massachusetts);152 or even 20 years (as in Oregon).153
Further, most of the legislative bodies in states allowing expungement of felony
convictions have (wisely) determined as a matter of policy that certain crimes – such as sex
crimes, crimes involving child victims, and violent felonies – should never be sealed. These
crimes are more heinous, offenders are at a much higher risk of recidivism than other lower-risk
offenders, and there may be a more compelling need for public availability of such records
(particularly as regards sex offenses, where many states have passed measures requiring sex
offender registration and protocols notifying residents when such an offender moves into the
neighborhood). In addition, motor vehicle offenses are usually ineligible for expungement to
ensure accurate motor vehicle records and driver histories.
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For example, the Arizona statute precludes the expungement of records of dangerous
offenses (without further definition), sex crimes requiring registration or crimes for which there
has been a finding of sexual motivation, all crimes involving a victim under 15 years of age, and
certain motor vehicle offenses.154 Kentucky permits the expungement of only those misdemeanor
convictions that did not involve sex offenses or a child victim;155 Mississippi limits expungement
of felony convictions to six enumerated crimes;156 New Hampshire does not allow the
expungement of convictions of violent crimes, crimes involving obstruction of justice, or
offenses subject to an extended term of imprisonment;157 and the Ohio statute precludes the
sealing of convictions of violent crimes, offenses involving child victims, and first or second
degree felonies.158
A minority of states allow for expungement of a sex offender’s conviction. In New
Hampshire, expungement of a felony conviction for sexual assault, felony indecent exposure, or
lewdness is possible once 10 years has passed since the date of completion of the sentence,
although violent crimes and offenses subject to an extended term of imprisonment are
excluded.159 Massachusetts allows the sealing of sex offense convictions after 15 years following
completion of the sentence, although level 2 or level 3 sex offenders are ineligible for the
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relief.160 And although Indiana does not provide for outright expungement, its statute permits
ex-offenders to petition the state police department to restrict access to the person’s limited
criminal history so that only criminal justice agencies can access the information, once 15 years
have passed since the person completed the sentence for the most recent conviction.161 The
provision contains no statutory bar to expunging sex offenses.162
One of the most comprehensive statutes, prescribing in detail the information to be
submitted with the petition, the boundaries of the expungement order, and exactly which crimes
are ineligible is New Jersey’s expungement law.163 In New Jersey, dismissed charges are
eligible for expungement immediately after disposition. A conviction of a non-criminal
disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense (the state’s equivalent of a misdemeanor)
may be expunged after 5 years from completion of the sentence,164 while a conviction of an
eligible crime (an indictable offense, the state’s equivalent of a felony) may be expunged after 10
years from completion of the sentence.165
New Jersey delineates specific crimes that are never eligible for expungement: criminal
homicide, except death by auto; kidnapping; luring or enticing; human trafficking; aggravated
sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contact; criminal sexual contact, if the victim is a
minor; criminal restraint and false imprisonment, if the victim is a minor; robbery; arson and
related offenses; endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would
impair or debauch the morals of the child; endangering the welfare of a child; causing or
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permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act; selling or manufacturing child
pornography; perjury; false swearing; knowingly promoting the prostitution of the actor’s child;
terrorism; producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or
radiological devices; and conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.166 New Jersey also
has a permanent bar for expungement of any convictions for crimes by public official who
breached the public trust or drug dealers who transacted in large quantities of unlawful controlled
substances.167
Of course, an expungement only serves the petitioner’s goal and societal aims if the order
is complied with and the stigmatic information is not disseminated. The electronic age and the
widespread availability of criminal records on the Internet have complicated that purpose. States
with expungement statutes have set different penalties to prevent inadvertent disclosure or, worse
yet, official misconduct. The “teeth” behind an expungement statute may be criminal in nature
(in instances of willful disclosure of an expunged record by a law enforcement or court official),
civil (allowing an action for damages by an aggrieved party or the Attorney General), or
unspecified. In Massachusetts, public and private employers are not permitted to ask about or
require the disclosure of expunged charges, and violators can be sued civilly by the Attorney
General, but the statute does not fashion a private right of action.168 In Arizona and Rhode
Island, an aggrieved party can recover civil damages from the discloser of expunged records.169
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Failure to comply with the expungement statute in New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia can subject
the violator to criminal penalties.170
States differ in the procedures for expungement, types of eligible offenses, when
expungements can be granted, and other conditions. For the most part, however, it is clear that
state legislatures have seen the unmistakable need to avoid hamstringing courts that desperately
want to provide relief to ex-offenders in certain circumstances if they are empowered to do so.
Alas, the U.S. Congress has yet to follow suit.

VII.

Proposed Legislation Authorizing Expungement of Federal Criminal Records
Two bills creating federal expungement authority were introduced in the current

congressional session, but neither was able to proceed to consideration by the House Judiciary
Committee, let alone advance to a floor vote. On June 1, 2011, Rep. Charles B. Rangel, a
prominent Democrat from New York, introduced the “Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of
2011” together with Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, Rep. Pete Stark of California, Rep. Alcee
L. Hastings of Florida, Rep. Karen Bass of California, Rep. Corinne Brown of Florida, outgoing
Rep. Edolphus Towns of New York, Rep. John Lewis of Georgia, and Rep. Jan Schakowsky of
Illinois.171 Rep. Hank Johnson of Georgia and Rep. Hansen Clarke of Michigan both signed on
as sponsors in May 2012.172 All eleven sponsors are Democrats.
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The other bill that would create a federal expungement mechanism – the “Fresh Start Act
of 2011” – was introduced on July 7, 2011, by Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, together with
Rep. Raul Grijalva of Arizona, Rep. Donald Payne of New Jersey,173 Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. of
Illinois,174 Rep. Bob Filner of California, and Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi of Puerto
Rico.175 Like Rangel’s bill, all of the bill’s sponsors are Democrats. Rep. Eleanor Holmes
Norton of the District of Columbia signed onto the bill on November 14, 2012.176
Previous incarnations of both bills have been proposed by Congressman Cohen and
Congressman Rangel, respectively, in previous congressional sessions without avail.177 The lack
of bipartisan support in the sponsorship of either bill does not spell improved prospects for
passage in a Republican-controlled House of Representatives. Nevertheless, this section will
compare both bills and combine certain provisions of the Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act
(hereafter the “Rangel bill”) and the Fresh Start Act (hereafter the “Cohen bill”) with worthy
provisions of state expungement statutes to propose a new, model federal expungement law.
Both the Cohen and Rangel bills are incredibly broad in the offenses they would reach.
Under both proposals, all nonviolent offenses – whether misdemeanors or serious felonies –
would be eligible for expungement. The Rangel proposal defines a “nonviolent offense” as any
federal misdemeanor or felony “that does not have as an element of the offense the use of a
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weapon or violence and which did not actually involve violence in its commission.”178 The
Cohen proposal ties the term to a crime of violence as it is defined in the United States Code.179
Both bills require the petitioner to be a first-time offender and preclude from eligibility
individuals with prior criminal histories. Both bills would require all requirements of the
sentence to be fulfilled prior to consideration of an expungement petition, including the payment
of fines and restitutions; completion of any term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised
release; and freedom from dependency or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances for at least
one year, if required by the terms of the sentence.

The Rangel bill additionally imposes

educational and community service requirements; a petitioner must have obtained a high school
diploma or completed a high school equivalency program and completed at least one year of
community service.180
Neither bill contains a provision concerning the expungement of records relating to
charges that did not result in any conviction. Neither bill speaks to the specific effect of
expungements on immigration status or past disciplinary or adverse employment actions taken
against offenders. A federal expungement statute should consider all avenues in which criminal
records may harm an exonerated defendant or one-time nonviolent offender long after the
charges are brought and expressly ensure that the person is restored to their pre-arrest state.
Both bills prescribe a procedure for the court to consider a petition for expungement,
consider the recommendations of the United States Attorney in the local federal district to be
submitted within 60 days, and “weigh the interests of the petitioner against the best interests of
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justice and public safety.”181 Neither bill is instructive as to what factors a court should employ
in the balancing test. The Cohen bill would require an expungement petition to be granted if it
is filed at least 7 years following completion of the sentence, unless the underlying offense of
conviction required the petitioner to register as a sex offender or caused a victim to sustain a loss
of $25,000 or more.182 Accordingly, a sex offender or the mastermind behind a massive Ponzi
scheme would not be entitled to a mandatory expungement (at least 7 years following release
from prison), but such an offender could see his/her entire record wiped clean through a
discretionary expungement under either the Cohen or Rangel legislation.
The high risk of recidivism of certain classes of offenders and the greater need for public
access to criminal records of sex offenders or fraudsters counsel in favor of a federal
expungement bill that more closely mirrors most state expungement statutes and is less generous
in its reach than the Cohen or Rangel proposals. This would also increase the likelihood that the
bill would garner additional support in both houses of Congress and eventually become law.
As such, certain enumerated felonies should be ineligible for expungement. The New
Jersey statute is instructive in this regard; homicide, kidnapping, sex crimes, human trafficking
crimes, child pornography, offenses involving underage victims, terrorism-related crimes, public
corruption, and perjury could be delineated as ineligible for such relief.183
Furthermore, a federal expungement statute should limit expungement as a matter of
right to a one-time nonviolent misdemeanor conviction or charges that did not result in
conviction. The bill could authorize courts to employ the balancing test to determine whether a
felon is deserving of the second chance provided by expungement relief on a case-by-case basis,
181
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but the bill should set forth the factors for a court to consider (such as time elapsed since the
offense, the offender’s age at the time of the misconduct, the nature and seriousness of the
offense, post-offense conduct and other evidence of rehabilitation, such as family life, vocation,
education, and community service). For felony convictions, the bill should impose a minimum
waiting period following completion of sentence, such as 5 to 10 years.184 The bill should also
permit expungements of investigative and arrest records following pretrial diversion or receipt of
a presidential pardon.
Finally, the bill should address consequences of disclosure by combining civil liability
with criminal exposure. Both the Cohen and Rangel bills would create a federal misdemeanor of
knowingly disclosing information related to an expunged conviction, similar to expungement
statutes in New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia.185 However, a private right of action should also be
included to afford aggrieved parties a civil remedy against violators.186

VIII. Conclusion
The barriers to employment, education, housing, and government assistance abound for
nonviolent ex-offenders despite their best efforts to reintegrate and reenter society. A lawful
permanent resident (green card holder) can even be deported for a first-time, nonviolent lapse in
judgment. The cases discussed in this paper reveal these collateral consequences can haunt
people from all walks of life – from firefighters to politicians to lawyers to stockbrokers to
physicians – and at all stages of their lives, from 20-somethings to septuagenarians. However,
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all of their alleged offenses were nonviolent, and most of the petitioners were onetime offenders
who had made a grave mistake that was out of character. Many of these individuals were cleared
of the allegations brought against them but continued to face suspicions of their guilt decades
after proving their innocence.
The inability of nonviolent ex-offenders to secure employment and become productive
citizens also exacerbates our recidivism problem, which in turn contributes to the skyrocketing
costs to taxpayers of supporting the world’s most overcrowded and expensive prison system.187
But the barriers to reentry disappear – and the individual enjoys restoration of dignity and
reputation – where a former defendant is able to seal or destroy his/her criminal record and is no
longer forced to disclose its existence.
The foregoing reasons explain why 46 states of our union, along with the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted some form of
expungement. Considering the presumption of innocence that attaches to criminal proceedings
as a hallmark of our democracy, it only seems fair that defendants who are cleared in court
should be able to clear their names and reputations and the stigma of charges that are dismissed.
It seems equally appropriate to allow – as half of all state legislatures have done – nonviolent
one-time misdemeanants or low-level felons to ease their reentry or reap the rewards of years of
law-abiding, productive life by forgiving them for an isolated (often youthful) transgression from
the distant past.
However, Congress has yet to act on repeated proposals by veteran members of the
House of Representatives to create a uniform expungement remedy for individuals haunted by
federal criminal records. Consequently, good hearted, hard-working Americans with low-risk
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criminal records (who are otherwise equally situated) may or may not face difficulties in finding
employment, prohibitions from state or federal vocational licenses or contractor opportunities,
ineligibility from participating in foster care and adoption programs, a lifetime ban from food
stamps and other federal assistance, ineligibility for federal student aid, and eviction from public
housing, depending upon where the individual lives or committed the offense many years ago.
As one scholar puts it, “A bedrock legal principle requires that similarly situated persons
be treated similarly. If a law fails, without reasonable justification, to treat those in similar
situations with the same degree of reward or consequence, it is stricken. As it relates to federal
expungement, rather than the existence of unbalanced legislation, the madness in the method
results from an absence of legislation, which causes an ex-offender’s opportunity to seek an
expungement to depend largely on the jurisdiction where the crime was committed.”188
Despite the lack of a federal expungement statute, Courts of Appeals in the Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have exercised ancillary jurisdiction to consider
expungement motions on equitable grounds. Nevertheless, district courts in those circuits have
only granted expungements in a handful of cases, while Courts of Appeals in the First, Third,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have refused to recognize jurisdiction to consider such motions
at all. A separate circuit split exists as to whether the courts may order the Executive Branch,
which hosts the law enforcement agencies possessing the most problematic criminal records, to
expunge its records even in the most extraordinary circumstances. Where the Supreme Court has
declined to resolve either circuit split, Congress must step in and extinguish the fog. After all,
federal courts have cried out for legislative action.189
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The federal expungement legislation proposed in this paper does not provide hardened
criminals an escape route from their past wrongdoing, nor does it pave a new road for such
offenders to commit more crimes without the backdrop of their past misdeeds. Expunged federal
criminal records would be restored automatically if an offender returns to the error of his/her old
ways, just like in the many states where expungements are available through comprehensive
statutory frameworks.
However, making expungements of federal criminal records available by statute would
serve laudable goals of criminal justice public policy. “Scripture informs [a] focus on
rehabilitation and reintegration, offering many examples of restorative justice in which the Lord
demands punishment and reparations for wrongs and then grants forgiveness.”190 A federal
expungement statute would allow ex-offenders to be rewarded for successful efforts at
rehabilitation. It would encourage decent human beings who have rejected their youthful
transgressions or a one-off incident in their past in favor of abiding the law to raise a family, seek
an education, secure gainful employment, and contribute to society. It would allow talented
individuals stigmatized by an isolated lapse in judgment to reacquire a security clearance and
serve their country as government architects, engineers, scientists, lawyers, and service members.
It would also keep individuals at a crossroads from returning to the environs that foster antisocial

has not yet chosen to do so.”); United States v. Tyler, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla.
2009) (“Because judicial expungement of criminal records implicates the separation of powers
doctrine, Congress should consider enacting legislation allowing relief in limited
circumstances…Notwithstanding the legitimacy of the Executive Branch's interest in
maintaining accurate arrest records, there is a question as to the value in creating a permanent
stigma for a wrongfully accused defendant, the likely results of which will be permanent removal
from a level playing field of future employment opportunities. And, certainly any interest the
Executive Branch could have in maintaining the records of illegally procured arrests would be
minimal at best and outweighed by adverse consequences to the innocent defendant.”).
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behavior and instead, find jobs and steer clear of a path that lands them back in custody while
draining valuable taxpayer resources.
It would allow nonviolent ex-offenders in search of redemption to finally find it, putting
an end to the lifelong sentence arising from the collateral consequences of having a criminal
record.
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